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Abstract
Water management infrastructures such as floodgates are critical and increasingly operated by Industrial Control
Systems (ICS). These systems are becoming more connected to the internet, either directly or through the
corporate networks. This makes them vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Abnormal behaviour in floodgates operated by
ICS could be caused by both (intentional) attacks and (accidental) technical failures. When operators notice
abnormal behaviour, they should be able to distinguish between those two causes to take appropriate measures,
because for example replacing a sensor in case of intentional incorrect sensor measurements would be ineffective
and would not block corresponding the attack vector. In the previous work, we developed the attack-failure
distinguisher framework for constructing Bayesian Network (BN) models to enable operators to distinguish between
those two causes, including the knowledge elicitation method to construct the directed acyclic graph and
conditional probability tables of BN models. As a full case study of the attack-failure distinguisher framework, this
paper presents a BN model constructed to distinguish between attacks and technical failures for the problem of
incorrect sensor measurements in floodgates, addressing the problem of floodgate operators. We utilised experts
who associate themselves with the safety and/or security community to construct the BN model and validate the
qualitative part of constructed BN model. The constructed BN model is usable in water management infrastructures
to distinguish between intentional attacks and accidental technical failures in case of incorrect sensor
measurements. This could help to decide on appropriate response strategies and avoid further complications in
case of incorrect sensor measurements.
Keywords: Bayesian network, DeMorgan model, Intentional attack, Probability elicitation, Safety, Security, Technical
failure, Water management
Introduction
Water management is one of the critical infrastructures
in countries like the Netherlands (Castellon and Frinking
2015). The proper functioning of water management in-
frastructures is vital for economic growth and societal
wellbeing. The unexpected closure of floodgates could
lead to severe economic damage, for instance, by delay-
ing cargo ships. Over the years, water management in-
frastructures have become dependent on Industrial
Control Systems (ICSs) to ensure efficient operations of
such infrastructures (Nogueira and Walraven 2018).
ICSs were originally designed for isolated environ-
ments (Effendi and Davis 2015). Such systems were
mainly susceptible to technical failures. The blackout in
the Canadian province of Ontario and the North-eastern
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and Mid-western United States is a typical example of a
technical failure in which the absence of alarm due to a
software bug in the alarm system left operators unaware
of the need to redistribute power (Zhivich and Cunning-
ham 2009). However, modern ICSs no longer operate in
isolation, but use other networks to facilitate and im-
prove business processes (Knowles et al. 2015). This in-
creased connectivity makes ICSs more vulnerable to
cyber-attacks apart from technical failures. A cyber-
attack on a German steel mill is a typical example in
which adversaries made use of corporate network to
enter the ICS network (RISI 2014). As an initial step, the
adversaries used both the targeted email and social en-
gineering techniques to acquire credentials for the cor-
porate network. Once they acquired credentials for the
corporate network, they worked their way into the
plant’s control system network and caused damage to
the blast furnace.
It is essential to distinguish between attacks and tech-
nical failures that would lead to abnormal behaviour in
the components of ICSs and take suitable measures. In
most cases, the initiation of response strategy presum-
ably aimed at technical failures would be ineffective in
the event of a targeted attack and may lead to further
complications. For instance, replacing a water level sen-
sor that is sending incorrect measurement data with a
new water level sensor would be a suitable response
strategy to technical failure of a water level sensor. How-
ever, this may not be an appropriate response strategy to
an attack on the water level sensor as it would not block
the corresponding attack vector. Furthermore, the initi-
ation of inappropriate response strategies would delay
the recovery of the system from adversaries and might
lead to harmful consequences. Noticeably, there is a lack
of decision support to distinguish between attacks and
technical failures.
Bayesian Networks (BNs) have the capacity to tackle
this challenge especially based on their real-world appli-
cations in medical diagnosis and fault diagnosis (Nakatsu
2009). BNs belong to the family of probabilistic graphical
models, consisting of a qualitative and a quantitative part
(Darwiche 2008). The qualitative part is a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG) of nodes and edges. Each node
represents a random variable, while the edges between
the nodes represent the conditional dependencies among
the random variables. The quantitative part takes the
form of a priori marginal and conditional probabilities
so as to quantify the dependencies between connected
nodes.
In order to address the above-mentioned research gap,
we developed the attack-failure distinguisher framework
in our previous work to help construct BN models for
distinguishing attacks and technical failures (Chockalin-
gam et al. 2019; Chockalingam et al. 2020). Furthermore,
we extended and combined fishbone diagrams within
our framework for knowledge elicitation to construct
the qualitative part of such BN models. Finally, we inte-
grated DeMorgan models and probability scales with nu-
merical and verbal anchors within our framework for
knowledge elicitation to construct the quantitative part
of such BN models. The present study aims to construct
a BN model based on the developed framework to dis-
tinguish between attacks and technical failures for an
observable problem in floodgates, providing a full case
study of the framework as well as addressing the prob-
lem of floodgate operators. This paper addresses the re-
search question: “How could we develop Bayesian
Network (BN) models for distinguishing attacks and tech-
nical failures in floodgates?”. The research objectives are:
RO1. To develop a BN model for distinguishing attacks
and technical failures in floodgates involving domain
experts using the attack-failure distinguisher
framework.
RO2. To demonstrate the suitability of a BN model
developed with the attack-failure distinguisher frame-
work in floodgates.
RO1 focuses primarily on the use of the expert elicit-
ation process proposed in the attack-failure distinguisher
framework to develop a BN model for distinguishing at-
tacks and technical failures in floodgates. Even though
the available system information during the elicitation
process is limited, this would not have an impact on
providing a full case study of the framework. RO2 fo-
cuses mainly on demonstrating when and how a BN
model developed with the framework would be useful in
practice, and not on assessing the validity of the specific
BN model, due to the lack of real water management in-
frastructure and testbed for evaluation.
At the start of this research, we investigated the avail-
ability of data corresponding to cyber-attacks and tech-
nical failures from real-world systems in the water
management sector. This data would help to construct
DAGs and populate Conditional Probability Tables
(CPTs). However, there is a lack of data regarding cyber-
attacks from real-world systems as experts in safety and/
or security of ICS in the water management sector in
the Netherlands claim that there are no/limited cyber-
attacks on their infrastructures. These experts are associ-
ated with the organisation responsible for the construc-
tion and maintenance of flood protection and
prevention in the Netherlands and their suppliers. More-
over, data corresponding to limited cyber-attacks that
happened is not shareable due to the sensitivity of data.
On the other hand, technical failures occur in their in-
frastructures which are documented as technical failure
reports. However, they are also not shareable due to the
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sensitivity of data. Therefore, we relied on expert
knowledge which is one of the predominant data
sources utilised to construct DAGs and populate
CPTs especially in domains where there is a limited
availability of data like cyber security (Chockalingam
et al. 2017). Furthermore, expert knowledge is sub-
stantive information on a specific domain based on
the system knowledge that is not commonly known
by others (Martin et al. 2012). Finally, it is also preva-
lent to use expert knowledge as the data source
which is one of the well-established and successful al-
ternate data source to data from real-world systems
in modelling cyber security (Holm et al. 2013; Husák
et al. 2018). Specifically, we utilised experts who asso-
ciate themselves with safety and/or security commu-
nity as it is appropriate for our application which
deals with distinguishing attacks and technical fail-
ures. In our context, we associate the security com-
munity as dealing with attacks. On the other hand,
we associate the safety community as dealing with
technical failures.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(i) we provide a full case study of the attack-failure dis-
tinguisher framework on how to construct a BN
model for an observable problem in floodgates using
expert knowledge.
(ii) we develop decision support that help operators to
distinguish between attacks and technical failures
for the problem of incorrect sensor measurements
in floodgates in the Netherlands.
(iii)we demonstrate the suitability of the constructed
BN model in the water management sector by
showing when and how this could be used in
practice.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2, we illustrate the different layers and the
components of an ICS. In Section 3, we describe our
existing framework that would help to construct BN
models for distinguishing attacks and technical failures
in addition to the systematic methods for knowledge
elicitation to construct the BN models. Section 4 dem-
onstrates the constructed BN model followed by discus-
sions in Section 5. Section 6 highlights the related work.
Fig. 1 Typical ICS Architecture and Layers
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Section 7 presents the conclusions and future work
directions.
ICS architecture
In this section, we illustrate the three different layers
and major components in each layer of an ICS.
Domain knowledge on ICSs is the starting point for
the application of our proposed approach. A typical
ICS consists of three layers: (i) Field instrumentation,
(ii) Process control, and (iii) Supervisory control,
bound together by network infrastructure, as shown
in Fig. 1.
The field instrumentation layer consists of sensors (Si)
and actuators (Ai), while the process control layer con-
sists of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)/Remote
Terminal Units (RTUs). Typically, PLCs have wired
communication capabilities whereas RTUs have wired or
wireless communication capabilities. The PLC/RTU re-
ceives measurement data from sensors, and controls the
physical systems through actuators (Skopik and Smith
2015). The supervisory control layer consists of historian
databases, software application servers, the Human-
Machine Interface (HMI), and the workstation. The his-
torian databases and software application servers enable
the efficient operation of the ICS. The low-level compo-
nents are configured and monitored with the help of the
workstation and the HMI, respectively (Skopik and
Smith 2015).
Framework for distinguishing attacks and
technical failures
This section describes the attack-failure distinguisher
framework proposed in our previous work to construct
BN models for distinguishing attacks and technical fail-
ures (Chockalingam et al. 2019).
The framework consists of three layers as shown in
Fig. 2. The middle layer consists of a problem variable
which is the major cause for an abnormal behaviour in a
component of the ICS (observable problem). The states
of the problem variable are the major causes of the ob-
servable problem (intentional attack and accidental tech-
nical failure). The upper layer consists of factors
contributing to the major causes of the problem. The
lower layer consists of observations (or test results)
which is defined as any information useful for determin-
ing the major cause of the problem based on the out-
come of tests conducted once the problem is observed
by a floodgate operator.
The BN models would be incomplete without the
quantitative part (CPTs for each variable). However,
probability elicitation is a challenging task in building
BNs, especially when it relies heavily on expert know-
ledge (Zhang and Thai 2016). The extensive workload
for experts in probability elicitation could affect the reli-
ability of elicited probabilities. Therefore, the framework
which we proposed in our previous work also includes
DeMorgan models that reduces the number of condi-
tional probabilities to elicit from domain experts in
Fig. 2 Framework for Distinguishing Attacks and Technical Failures
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constructing the quantitative part of BN models, espe-
cially this technique reduces the number of parameters
that need to be elicited from exponential to linear in the
number of parents to define a full CPT for the child
variable (Chockalingam et al. 2019; Chockalingam et al.
2020). We adopted DeMorgan models because it is the
most suitable technique for our purpose (Chockalingam
et al. 2020). Furthermore, we integrated probability
scales with numerical and verbal anchors with DeMor-
gan models to facilitate individual probability entry by
providing visual aids to help experts answer in terms of
probabilities (Chockalingam et al. 2020).
The DeMorgan model is applicable when there are
several parents and a common child. The DeMorgan
model inherently assumes binary variables. In our appli-
cation, the DeMorgan model could be used to elicit con-
ditional probabilities for the problem variable as they
have several contributory factors (parents). On the other
hand, the CPTs of the contributory factors and observa-
tions (or test results) could be elicited directly from ex-
perts as they are straightforward when they do not have
several parents. The DeMorgan model assumes that one
of the two states of each variable is always the distin-
guished state as shown in Fig. 3. Usually such state of
the child variable depends on the modelled domain
(Zagorecki 2010). This is a typical state of the corre-
sponding child variable (Kraaijeveld 2005). In our appli-
cation, the distinguished state of the problem variable
(“Major cause for <an observable problem>”) is chosen
as “accidental technical failure” as this is the a priori ex-
pected major cause, based on the higher frequency of
technical failures compared to the attacks (Chockalin-
gam et al. 2019; Chockalingam et al. 2020). The distin-
guished state of a parent variable is relative to the type
of causal interaction with the child variable (Maaskant
and Druzdzel 2008). The same parent variable can have
different distinguished states in different interactions
that it participates in with the different child variables.
There are four different types of causal interactions
between an individual parent (X) and a child (Y) in the
DeMorgan model: (i) cause, (ii) barrier, (iii) inhibitor,
and (iv) requirement.
(i) Cause: X is a causal factor and has a positive
influence on Y. In this type of causal interaction
between an individual parent (X) and a child (Y),
the distinguished state of the corresponding parent
variable is “False” (Maaskant and Druzdzel 2008).
Consequently, when the parent variable is “False”, it
is certain not to trigger a change from the typical
state of the child variable. When the parent variable
is “True”, it will trigger a change from the typical
state of the child variable, with a certain probability
(vX).
(ii) Barrier: This is a negated counterpart of cause, i.e.,
X’ is a causal factor and has a positive influence on
Y. In this type of causal interaction between an
individual parent (X) and a child (Y), the
distinguished state of the corresponding parent
variable is “True” (Maaskant and Druzdzel 2008).
Accordingly, when the parent variable is “True”, it
is certain not to trigger a change from the typical
state of the child variable. When the parent variable
is “False”, it will trigger a change from the typical
state of the child variable, with a certain probability
(vX).
(iii) Inhibitor: X inhibits Y. In this type of causal
interaction between an individual parent (X) and
Fig. 3 DeMorgan Model: Causal Interaction Types
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a child (Y), the distinguished state of the
corresponding parent variable is “False”
(Maaskant and Druzdzel 2008). As a result, when
the parent variable is “False”, it is certain not to
prevent a change from the typical state of the
child variable. When the parent variable is
“True”, it will prevent a change from the typical
state of the child variable, with a certain
probability (dX).
(iv)Requirement: The relationship between an inhibitor
and requirement is similar to the relationship
between a cause and barrier. X’ inhibits Y. In this
type of causal interaction between an individual
parent (X) and a child (Y), the distinguished state of
the corresponding parent variable is “True”
(Maaskant and Druzdzel 2008). Hence, when the
parent is “True”, it is certain not to prevent a
change from the typical state of the child variable.
When the parent variable is “False”, it will prevent a
change from the typical state of the child variable,
with a certain probability (dX).
The DeMorgan model is an extension and a combin-
ation of the noisy-OR and noisy-AND model which sup-
ports modelling the above-mentioned types of causal
interactions (Maaskant and Druzdzel 2008). The property
of accountability in the noisy-OR model is applicable to
the DeMorgan model with a slight modification as it also
exploits causal independence: In case all the modelled par-
ents of the child are in their distinguished state, the prop-
erty of accountability requires that the child be presumed
their distinguished state. However, in many cases, this is
not a realistic assumption as it is difficult to capture all
the possible parents of the child (Fallet-Fidry et al. 2012).
Specifically, this is not realistic in our application as it is
difficult to capture all the possible contributory factors of
an observable problem due to “intentional attack”. In the
DeMorgan model, the leak parameter (vXL ) deals with the
possible parents of the child that are not previously known
and explicitly modelled.
In general, the size of the CPT of a binary variable
with n binary parents is 2n + 1. However, only n + 1
parameters are sufficient to completely define CPT using
the DeMorgan model as it exploits causal independ-
ence. In the example shown in Fig. 3, only five pa-
rameters are sufficient to completely define the CPT
of child variable (Y) using the DeMorgan model
instead of 64 entries. We could find the values for
required parameters from the experts to completely
define CPT using the DeMorgan model based on ap-
propriate question for each type of causal interaction
shown in Table 1.
Once we determine the required parameters based on
appropriate elicitation questions, we can completely de-
fine the CPT of the child variable using (1):









In the Eq. (1), Y represents the effect variable which
has values y for the effect being in the non-distinguished
state (“Intentional attack”) and y’ for the effect being in
the distinguished state (“Accidental technical failure”). X
denotes the set of parents which interact with the effect
variable as promoting influences, U denotes the set of
parents which interact with the effect variable as inhibit-
ing influences, +X denotes the subset of X that contains
all parents that are in their non-distinguished states, +U
denotes the subset of U that contains all parents that are
in their non-distinguished states. vXL denotes the leak par-
ameter which expresses the probability of y (“Intentional
attack”) given all parents are in their distinguished states,
vXi denotes the probability of y (“Intentional attack”) given
that the parent Xi is not in its distinguished state and all
other parents are in their distinguished states, dUi denotes
the probability of y’ (“Accidental technical failure”) given
that the parent Ui is not in its distinguished state and all
other parents are in their distinguished states.
Applying BNs for distinguishing attacks and
technical failures
This section describes how we constructed the BN
model for distinguishing attacks and technical failures in
Table 1 Causal Interactions and their Corresponding Elicitation Questions in the DeMorgan Model
Type of Causal Interaction Elicitation Question
Leak “What is the probability that the child is in their non-distinguished state given that the par-
ents are in their distinguished states?”
Cause, Barrier
Note: There is a difference between the non-distinguished
state of a cause and barrier.
“What is the probability that the child is in their non-distinguished state given that all the
parents are in their distinguished states, except Xi and no other unmodelled causal factors
are present?”.
Inhibitor, Requirement
Note: There is a difference between the non-distinguished
state of an inhibitor and requirement.
“What is the probability that the child is in their distinguished state given that the parents
are in their distinguished states, except Ui and no other unmodelled causal factors are
present?”.
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floodgates. We considered the observable problem for
this application as “Sensor sends incorrect water level
measurements” because it could lead to serious conse-
quences in the case of floodgate. In case the floodgate
closes when it should not, based on the incorrect water
level measurements sent by the sensor, it would lead to
severe economic damage, for instance, by delaying cargo
ships. On the other hand, in case the floodgate opens
when it should not, due to incorrect water level mea-
surements sent by the sensor, it would lead to flooding.
Construction of qualitative BN model for distinguishing
attacks and technical failures in floodgates
We have utilised a multimethodology approach for data
collection. Multimethodology refers to using more than
one method of data collection in a research study
(Brewer and Hunter 1989), providing more comprehen-
sive data. In our study, we utilised a focus group work-
shop and a questionnaire to gather data for constructing
the qualitative BN model. Firstly, we conducted a focus
group workshop with five participants who have experi-
ence working with safety and/or security of water man-
agement infrastructures operated by ICS. The major
objective of this focus group is to discuss and identify
contributory factors and observations (or test results) for
the problem which we considered. Each participant was
provided with a set of questions as shown in Additional
file 1: Appendix A. Most of these questions are open-
ended that ask for factors that would contribute to the
major cause of the considered problem (attack/technical
failure) and tests that would provide additional informa-
tion to distinguish between the major cause of the con-
sidered problem (attack/technical failure) after the
problem is observed by the floodgate operator. For in-
stance, we considered the problem “the sensor sends in-
correct water level measurements” and asked the
participants: “Which contributory factors would increase
the likelihood of the problem due to (accidental) sensor
failure?”. The moderator explained each question to the
participants and facilitated the discussion among the
participants to identify a set of contributory factors and
observations (or test results) for the observable problem
which we considered.
After the focus group workshop, we employed a ques-
tionnaire to gather data for constructing the qualitative
BN model. We employed snowball sampling to recruit
other participants for this study through initial partici-
pants. This sampling technique is useful as it helps to
find experts in ICS safety and/or security quickly. The
participants were provided with the same set of ques-
tions which we provided to focus group participants as
shown in Additional file 1: Appendix A to elicit con-
tributory factors and observations (or test results) for
the considered problem. We received 10 responses in
total for the questionnaire. However, we excluded one
response as the participant did not have any experience
working with ICS. Importantly, seven out of nine re-
spondents have five or more years working experience
with ICS which helps to ensure reliability of data. In
addition, we had a good mix of participants from safety
and/or security community which is important for our
application. Specifically, two out of nine respondents as-
sociate themselves with both safety and security, two out
of nine respondents associate themselves with safety and
five out of nine respondents associate themselves with
security.
We combined the data gathered from the focus group
and questionnaire for coding. We utilised thematic cod-
ing by grouping contributory factors which are similar
under a category. For instance, there were nine re-
sponses such as “easy access to sensor”, “attacker has
physical access to the sensor”, “free access to sensor”
which we categorised into “easy physical access to sen-
sor”. On the other hand, we grouped and removed con-
tributory factors which are not contributory factors
based on our definition. For instance, “Man-in-the-Mid-
dle attack using the wired connection” is not a specific
contributory factor but rather a type of attack that an at-
tacker might employ. Once we categorised the contribu-
tory factors, there were 14 categories (parent nodes) in
total. However, this would result in the CPT size of the
problem variable as 16,384, which makes it unmanage-
able. Therefore, we utilised parent node divorcing, which
allows parent nodes to be grouped hierarchically to
avoid excessive inbound links to the child node. By uti-
lising parent node divorcing, we reduced the number of
parent nodes to eight which in turn reduced the CPT
size of the problem variable to 256. For instance, we
grouped hierarchically three different parent nodes (lo-
cation of sensor susceptible to severe weather, location
of sensor susceptible to biological fouling, location of
sensor susceptible to physical contact of marine vessel)
into a single parent node (location of sensor susceptible
to external factor) as shown in Fig. 4, because they are
of the same theme and no original interactions are lost
in the process. Figure 4 shows two different types of
causal interactions between an individual contributory
factor and the problem: (i) cause and (ii) inhibitor. The
contributory factors including easy physical accessibility,
no sensor data integrity verification, easy network acces-
sibility, presence of software in sensor and no sensor
firmware update have a positive influence on the prob-
lem (major cause for sensor sends incorrect water level
measurements). On the other hand, the contributory fac-
tors including maintenance issue, no use of Electro-
Magnetic Interference (EMI) shielding technique, loca-
tion of sensor susceptible to external factor have an inhi-
biting influence on the problem. Once the qualitative
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BN model shown in Fig. 4 is constructed, we validated it
through a focus group workshop with five experts who
have experience working with safety and/or security of
ICS in the water management sector in the Netherlands.
We asked specifically whether anything is missing or not
appropriate in the qualitative BN model. However, the
experts did not find any need to add or update anything
in the constructed qualitative BN model.
Construction of quantitative BN model for distinguishing
attacks and technical failures in floodgates
A multimethodology approach is used for quantitative
data collection like we did for the construction of the
qualitative BN model. In order to gather data for popu-
lating the BN model with probabilities, we utilised a
focus group workshop and a questionnaire. Firstly, we
conducted a focus group workshop with five participants
who have experience working with safety and/or security
of ICS in the water management sector in the
Netherlands. The major objective of this focus group is
to elicit probabilities corresponding to each variable in
our qualitative BN model that could help to determine
the major cause (intentional attack or accidental tech-
nical failure) of the problem (sensor sends incorrect
water level measurements) when observed.
Additional file 1: Appendix B shows a set of questions
which we provided to each participant at the start of the
focus group workshop. We asked each participant to an-
swer the question using a probability scale with numer-
ical and verbal anchors to elicit prior probabilities
corresponding to the contributory factors and condi-
tional probabilities corresponding to the problem and
observations (or test results). For instance, we elicited
the prior probability of the variable “Easy Physical Access
to Sensor” and a conditional probability of the variable
“Major cause for sensor sends incorrect water level mea-
surements” as shown in Fig. 5. We utilised a systematic
and effective way of eliciting marginal and conditional
probabilities from the experts by asking appropriate
types of questions, taking into account the type of
causal interaction as shown in Table 1. It is evident
that providing the fragment of text (i.e., the elicitation
question) as shown in Figs. 5 and 6 instead of the
mathematical notation to elicit conditional probabil-
ities from domain experts worked very well on the
development of a BN model supporting patient-
specific therapy selection for oesophageal carcinoma
(Van der Gaag et al. 2002). Furthermore, this is also
employed in the development of a BN model using
domain experts that help to assess the potential ef-
fects of establishing the ENSI navigation service to
ship collisions and groundings (Hänninen et al. 2014).
In our application, the participants were asked to an-
swer the questions individually to avoid bias in their
Fig. 4 Constructed Qualitative BN Model. (In this Figure, the presence of contributory factors and observations (or test results) colored in dark red
would increase the likelihood of the problem (colored in red) due to an attack on the sensor. Furthermore, the presence of contributory factors
and observations (or test results) colored in orange would increase the likelihood of the problem due to sensor failure)
Chockalingam et al. Cybersecurity            (2021) 4:29 Page 8 of 19
responses. Furthermore, the moderator provided clari-
fications individually in case there are any questions
from the participants. Once the participants answered
the questions individually, the moderator facilitated a
discussion on the reasoning behind the varied prob-
abilities which they provided for some variables. How-
ever, the purpose of this discussion is not to make
them reach a consensus as it could make the re-
sponses biased.
In addition to the focus group workshop, we utilised a
questionnaire to gather data for populating the BN
model with probabilities. We used snowball sampling to
recruit other participants for this study through initial
participants in the focus group workshop as the target
group is limited and rare to find. This sampling tech-
nique makes it easier to find experts in safety and/or se-
curity of ICS in the water management sector in the
Netherlands quickly. We provided a set of questions to
the participants mainly to elicit probabilities correspond-
ing to each variable in the constructed BN model as
shown in Additional file 1: Appendix B. For instance, we
asked for the prior probability of the variable “Easy Phys-
ical Access to Sensor” and a conditional probability of
the variable “Major cause for sensor sends incorrect
water level measurements” as shown in Fig. 6. The dif-
ference compared to the focus group workshop ques-
tions is that the probability scale with numerical and
verbal anchors is not directly used as it is not practicable
in the online questionnaire. However, we utilised the
verbal and corresponding numerical anchors from the
probability scale as answer choices for each question in
the online questionnaire in addition to “others” option
which could help participants to provide fine-grained
probabilities as shown in Fig. 6. We received five re-
sponses in total. Overall, seven out of 10 participants
have more than 5 years work experience with safety
and/or security of ICS in the water management sector
in the Netherlands.
Once we collected the responses from the participants
in both the focus group workshop and questionnaire, we
tabulated them together. Furthermore, we noticed that
there were some missing data due to no or invalid re-
sponse from some respondents. For instance, we consid-
ered responses like “others” without mentioning any
specific likelihood value as an invalid response. Further-
more, it is also not possible to clarify with the respond-
ent as responses are anonymous. Ignoring or discarding
missing data is one of the most common approaches
used to deal with the missing data (Baraldi and Enders
2010; Twala 2009). Listwise deletion and pairwise dele-
tion are the two different methods which could help to
ignore or discard the missing data (Baraldi and Enders
2010). Pairwise deletion is appropriate for our applica-
tion as it ignores or discards only the missing data and
considers the other data provided by these experts. This
is easy to implement. Therefore, we utilised pairwise de-
letion to ignore or discard the missing data in our appli-
cation. Listwise deletion is not appropriate for our
application as it leads to loss of data by completely ig-
noring or discarding data from four out of 10 experts
since they have no or invalid response to a question.
Once the missing data is ignored or discarded, the
probabilities Pi(X) elicited from the experts need to be
combined. One of the most widely used method to com-
bine the probabilities elicited from the experts is linear
pooling (Farr et al. 2018; Ouchi 2004). Using the linear
Fig. 5 Focus Group Workshop – Example Questions
Chockalingam et al. Cybersecurity            (2021) 4:29 Page 9 of 19
pooling method, the combined probabilities can be com-
puted using (2):
P Xð Þ ¼
Xn
i¼1
wiPi Xð Þ ð2Þ
Where wi are positive weights given to each of the n





There are two different types of linear pooling method:
(i) prior linear pooling, and (ii) posterior linear pooling
(Farr et al. 2018). Prior linear pooling combines elicited
probabilities from experts corresponding to each variable
in the BN model, which could then be used to compute
posterior probabilities of target variables by providing
evidences to some variables. On the other hand, in pos-
terior linear pooling, elicited probabilities from n experts
are used to construct n distinct BNs. Once we construct
the n distinct BNs, we run these BNs by providing same
evidences to the same set of variables in these BNs and
compute different posterior probabilities in each of these
BNs. Finally, the posterior probabilities generated in n
distinct BNs are combined. However, this is not appro-
priate for our application as it is not practicable for per-
forming diagnostics in a timely way. Furthermore, this is
not suitable for our application as we ignored or dis-
carded missing data which could make it not possible to
construct BNs with no probabilities for some variables.
In our application, we utilised prior linear pooling as it
is appropriate based on its advantages (Farr et al. 2018).
Each of the 10 experts is given equal weighting as they
all have experience working with safety and/or security
of ICS in the water management sector in the
Netherlands. Furthermore, we consider each respon-
dent’s experience to be equal in value. So, we combined
the probabilities from n experts using (2).
The probabilities corresponding to contributory fac-
tors and observations (or test results) are now complete.
However, we utilised DeMorgan model to reduce the
number of CPT entries that needs to be elicited from ex-
perts to nine. Therefore, we computed the remaining
CPT entries corresponding to the problem variable using
(1). An excerpt of CPT entries corresponding to the
problem variable is shown in Table 2. The complete BN
model with both the qualitative and quantitative compo-
nent is shown Fig. 7.
The DeMorgan model is not applicable for eliciting
conditional probabilities of observations (or test results)
as they only have one parent (i.e., the problem variable).
Therefore, we elicited these probabilities directly from
experts as they are straightforward. This is because the
Fig. 6 Questionnaire – Example Questions
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CPT size of each observation (or test result) is 4 (21 + 1)
as they only have one parent. For instance, we asked for
a conditional probability of the variable “test/redundant
sensor also sends incorrect water level measurements”
taking into account the major cause (“Intentional at-
tack”/“Accidental technical failure”) of the observed
problem (“Sensor sends incorrect water level measure-
ments”) is already known as shown in Fig. 5.
Demonstration of the constructed BN model
In this section, we demonstrate the suitability of the
constructed BN model based on two different illustrative
scenarios. It is not possible to utilise the real floodgate
for demonstrating the suitability of the constructed BN
model by putting it into practice due to availability and
criticality issues. Therefore, we relied on two different il-
lustrative scenarios for this purpose.
These two different illustrative scenarios help to show
when and how the constructed BN model using the
attack-failure distinguisher framework would be useful
in practice. Firstly, we assume that the floodgate oper-
ator observed that a sensor sends incorrect water level
measurements by noticing the mismatch between the
measurements from physical water level scale and water
level sensor. In order to choose the appropriate response
strategy, the floodgate operator needs to determine the
major cause of this problem (i.e., whether this problem
is caused by an attack or technical failure), which is the
aim of the constructed BN model.
Once the floodgate operator noticed the incorrect sen-
sor measurements problem, they need to provide the
evidence that is available for variables in the upper layer
(contributory factors) and lower layer (test results). This
could help the constructed BN model compute posterior
probabilities of both the states in the problem variable
(attack and technical failure) based on the provided
evidences.
In the first illustrative scenario, the floodgate operator
set evidence for variables based on the available informa-
tion as shown in Table 3. Based on such evidence, the
posterior probability is computed by the constructed BN
model for other variables without any evidence. The BN
model in Fig. 8 shows that the incorrect water level
measurement problem is most likely due to technical
failure based on the provided evidences. This informa-
tion would help to select the appropriate response strat-
egy (i.e., to repair or replace the water level sensor).
In the second illustrative scenario, the floodgate oper-
ator sets different evidence for variables in the con-
structed BN model based on the available information as
shown in Table 3. Based on the provided evidences, the
posterior probability is computed for other variables
without any evidence in the constructed BN model. Fig-
ure 9 shows that the incorrect water level measurement
problem is most likely due to attack based on the evi-
dences provided by the floodgate operator. This infor-
mation would help to choose the suitable response
strategy (i.e., to block the corresponding attack vector).
The difference between the two scenarios can be ex-
plained as follows. In the first illustrative scenario, the
sensor/sensor communication cable is not easily access-
ible to an unauthorised person, whereas there is a lack
of maintenance of the sensor/sensor communication
cable and the location of the sensor is susceptible to ex-
ternal factors such as biological fouling. In addition, the
sensor communication cable is deteriorated, and the
sensor sends correct water level measurements after
cleaning the sensor. Typically, the above-mentioned fac-
tors increase the likelihood of the problem due to acci-
dental technical failure, which is reflected in terms of
the posterior probability of Y in Fig. 8. In contrast, in
the second illustrative scenario, the sensor/sensor com-
munication cable is properly maintained, and the loca-
tion of the sensor is not susceptible to external factors
such as biological fouling, whereas the sensor/sensor
communication cable is easily physically accessible to an
unauthorised person. In addition, the test/redundant
sensor also sends incorrect water level measurements.
Typically, the above-mentioned factors increase the like-
lihood of the problem due to intentional attack, which is
reflected in terms of the posterior probability of Y in
Fig. 9.
Discussion
This section mainly highlights and discusses implica-
tions, limitations of this study and potential future
directions.
Table 2 CPT Excerpt – Problem Variable
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 Y
Attack Failure
True True True True True True True True 0.02 0.98
True True True True True True True False 0.09 0.91
True True True True True True False True 0.06 0.94
True True True True True True False False 0.24 0.76
True True True True True False True True 0.09 0.91
True True True True True False True False 0.38 0.62
True True True True True False False True 0.24 0.76
True True True True True False False False 0.97 0.03
True True True True False True True True 0.02 0.98
True True True True False True True False 0.09 0.91
In this table, C1: Easy physical accessibility, C2: No sensor data integrity
verification, C3: Easy network accessibility, C4: Presence of software in sensor,
C5: No sensor firmware update, C6: Maintenance issue, C7: No use of EMI
shielding technique, C8: Location of sensor susceptible to external factor and
Y: Major cause for sensor sends incorrect water level measurements
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The results of existing integrated safety and security
risk assessment methods would help to choose suitable
risk treatments during the design phase before an attack
or technical failure occurs. On the other hand, our
method involving the attack-failure distinguisher frame-
work would help to choose appropriate response strat-
egies during the operational phase when an attack or
technical failure occurs. Furthermore, our method would
help operators to think more proactively about reactive
safety and security.
As a part of the probability elicitation process, in
addition to the case outline, we also provided informa-
tion related to the type of floodgate (criticality rating:
very high) and context (threat level: substantial). This
guideline helps to avoid very diverse responses over par-
ticipants as they have substantive information based on
the system knowledge. The raw data on elicited prob-
abilities is not shared due to criticality and sensitivity is-
sues. However, we provided boxplots based on
probabilities elicited from experts for five variables as
shown in Fig. 10. This shows the diversity of raw data
on elicited probabilities. In particular, the interquartile
range for most of these variables are low which confirms
that raw data on elicited probabilities is less dispersed.
This also indicates that experts have more or less com-
mon understanding of the system with the limited sys-
tem information provided as we relied on experts who
have experience working with safety and/or security of
ICS in the water management sector in the Netherlands.
However, the elicited probabilities can be further refined
by providing additional system information details to
make it more realistic in the future as the CPT values
highly likely depend on the specifics of a particular
system.
We constructed the qualitative BN model using the
data gathered from a focus group workshop and ques-
tionnaire that had 14 participants in total. This focus
group workshop included five participants who are ex-
perts on safety and/or security of ICS in the water man-
agement sector in the Netherlands. Furthermore, this
was complemented with a questionnaire which had nine
respondents who have at least a year of experience
working with safety and/or security of ICS in general
from different countries. Finally, the constructed qualita-
tive BN model was validated through a focus group
workshop, which had the participation of five experts on
safety and/or security of ICS in the water management
sector in the Netherlands. In terms of generalisability,
the constructed qualitative BN model can be used as a
starting point for constructing a BN model for the same
problem (incorrect sensor measurements) in a similar
type of infrastructure in a different country or in another
sector. This can be further updated and validated by in-
volving experts in the corresponding country/sector.
Fig. 7 Constructed BN Model – No Evidence Provided. (In this figure, SC1: Easy physical access to sensor, SC2: Easy physical access to
communication cable, C1: Easy physical accessibility, C2: No sensor data integrity verification, SC3: Sensor is connected to WIFI, SC4: ICS and
corporate networks are interconnected, C3: Easy network accessibility, C4: Presence of software in sensor, C5: No sensor firmware update, TC1:
Lack of maintenance of sensor, TC2: Lack of maintenance of communication cable, SC5: Lack of maintenance, SC6: Poor maintenance process, C6:
Maintenance issue, C7: No use of EMI shielding technique, SC7: Location of sensor susceptible to severe weather, SC8: Location of sensor
susceptible to physical contact of marine vessel, SC9: Location of sensor susceptible to biological fouling, C8: Location of sensor susceptible to
external factor, Y: Major cause for sensor sends incorrect water level measurements, TR1: Test/redundant sensor also sends incorrect water level
measurements, TR2: Sudden change of water level measurements from sensor, TR3: Suspicious traffic in ICS network, TR4: Abnormalities in other
components, TR5: No power in sensor, TR6: Communication cable deteriorated, TR7: Sensor sends correct water level measurements after
cleaning sensor, TR8: Sensor sends correct water level measurements after recalibrating sensor, TR9: EMI along cable)
Chockalingam et al. Cybersecurity            (2021) 4:29 Page 12 of 19
On the other hand, we constructed the quantitative
BN model based on elicited probabilities through a focus
group workshop and questionnaire. The focus group
workshop included five experts on safety and/or security
of ICS in the water management sector in the
Netherlands. Furthermore, this was complemented with
a questionnaire which had five respondents who have at
least a year of experience working with safety and/or se-
curity of ICS in water management sector in the
Netherlands. During these elicitation processes, in
addition to the case outline, we also provided informa-
tion corresponding to the type of floodgate and context
which includes the criticality rating and threat level.
With regard to generalisability of the quantitative BN
model, this is limited as it is only applicable to a specific
type of floodgates in a specific context in the
Netherlands. Furthermore, this is also not directly gener-
alisable to the same problem (incorrect sensor measure-
ments) in a similar type of infrastructure in a different
country or in another sector. Therefore, the probabilities
need to be elicited from experts in the corresponding
country/domain directly to make the quantitative BN
model reliable.
There are two key limitations which impacted our
sample size for focus group workshops and question-
naire: (i) Limited experts on safety and/or security of
ICS in the water management sector: We relied on ex-
perts who associate themselves with safety and/or secur-
ity of ICS to elicit contributory factors and test results
(or observations). We also relied on experts who associ-
ate themselves with safety and/or security of ICS in the
water management sector in the Netherlands to elicit
Table 3 Evidences Corresponding to both the Illustrative Scenarios
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probabilities. This enhances the reliability of elicited
contributory factors, test results (or observations) and
probabilities as they have prior knowledge about the sys-
tem. However, this leads to the limitation of fewer re-
spondents. In the Netherlands, there is a limited group
of safety and/or security experts in the water manage-
ment sector. Therefore, we utilised snowball sampling as
it helps to reach more number experts in that limited
target group, (ii) Limited time availability of experts: Ini-
tially, we employed focus groups as a technique to elicit
contributory factors, test results (or observations) and
probabilities. However, there were practical difficulties
to gather a group of people at the same time due to the
limited time availability of experts. This resulted in focus
groups with a somewhat lower number of experts (five).
Therefore, we complemented focus groups with ques-
tionnaires to reach a bit more number of experts in that
limited target group. Due to limited target group and
time availability of experts, it was not possible to reach
much more experts to elicit contributory factors, test re-
sults (or observations) and probabilities.
However, due to such limitations, it seems to be preva-
lent in practice to have a group size less than 10 (Hänni-
nen et al. 2014; Van der Gaag et al. 2002). For instance,
eight experts with maritime working experience helped
in the construction of BN model to assess the potential
effects of establishing the ENSI navigation service to ship
collisions and groundings. Furthermore, in an another
Fig. 9 Constructed BN Model – Second Illustrative Scenario
Fig. 8 Constructed BN Model – First Illustrative Scenario
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instance, two experts in gastrointestinal oncology helped
in the development of decision support for patient-
specific therapy selection for oesophageal carcinoma
(Van der Gaag et al. 2002).
In this paper, we provided a case study of attack-
failure distinguisher framework by developing a BN
model for the problem of incorrect sensor measure-
ments in floodgates. Furthermore, we provided two dif-
ferent illustrative scenarios using the developed BN
model to demonstrate the suitability of such models. In
the future, this would help practitioners to develop BN
models for different problems in different sectors. When
we rely on expert knowledge as the data source, there
need to be appropriate methods to effectively elicit
knowledge from experts. The attack-failure distinguisher
framework includes extended fishbone diagrams to sup-
port brainstorming with experts in constructing the
DAGs of BN models for our application. Furthermore,
the attack-failure distinguisher framework includes
DeMorgan model and probability scale with numerical
and verbal anchors to effectively elicit probabilities from
experts to completely define CPTs of BN models for our
application. Some of these methods have already been
applied separately in practical applications for different
problems in different sectors (Hänninen et al. 2014; Ja-
cobs 2018; Van der Gaag et al. 2002). For instance,
Jacobs used extended fishbone diagrams for an example
ProRail case related to carriage registration (Jacobs
2018). They populated the contributory factors on the
left side of the extended fishbone diagram for the prob-
lem (“Incorrect registration”). Furthermore, they popu-
lated with observations on the right side of the extended
fishbone diagram. This shows that individual compo-
nents of the attack-failure distinguisher framework are
effective and applicable for different problems in differ-
ent sectors.
Historical data on attacks and technical failures in the
water management sector in the Netherlands is unavail-
able for research due to sensitivity issues. Therefore, it
would not be possible to develop models that could help
to distinguish between attacks and technical failures for
the problem of incorrect sensor measurements using a
data-driven approach. However, in the future, the un-
availability of historical data on attacks and technical
failures would not deter modelling cyber security for ICS
anymore as we utilised a knowledge-based approach to
develop a model for distinguishing attacks and technical
failures.
The other alternate data sources such as red team vs.
blue team exercises were not possible due to practical-
ities, especially there is a lack of testbeds which could fa-
cilitate such exercises in the Netherlands. Such data
Fig. 10 Boxplots for Different Variables in the Constructed BN Model
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sources could further improve the reliability of data used
to construct DAG and populate CPTs. Notably, the Crit-
ical Infrastructure Security Showdown (CISS) is con-
ducted by Singapore University of Technology and
Design on their Secure Water Treatment (SWaT)
testbed (Antonioli et al. 2017). Such type of events could
provide information about contributory factors and ob-
servations (or test results) corresponding to attacks. For
instance, we could interview members of the red team
regarding which factors in the infrastructure contributed
to the success of their attack. Furthermore, we could
interview members of the blue team regarding tests (or
observations) which helped them to diagnose an attack.
The use of existing testbeds like SWaT testbed is not ap-
propriate for this study as it did not reflect the system
which we considered i.e., a specific type of floodgates in
the Netherlands. Therefore, there is a need for a testbed
in the Netherlands which reflect the system which we
considered for using red team vs. blue team exercises as
an alternate data source and/or a system for evaluation
in the future.
The real water management infrastructure like a flood-
gate is not available for the evaluation of the developed
BN model due to availability and criticality issues.
Therefore, we could not perform naturalistic evaluation,
which involves evaluating the developed artefact with
real users and real systems in the real setting. Therefore,
we relied on the artificial evaluation, which involves
evaluating the developed BN model in a contrived and
non-realistic way. However, we made it more realistic
with real-users, and realistic problems to correspond the
results to real use. Furthermore, the developed BN
model is validated using expert evaluation and illustra-
tive scenarios. However, the quantitative BN model
needs to be further evaluated using a testbed in the fu-
ture. Currently, this was not possible due to the lack of
testbed in the Netherlands which reflect the system
which we considered. However, this evaluation would
also help to answer the key question on how much con-
fidence should an operator have based on such BN-
based analysis.
Related work
This section highlights application of BNs in different
domains. Furthermore, we summarise important pat-
terns corresponding to the application of BNs in cyber
security, which we used as a basis to develop BN models
for our application. In addition, we point out studies that
relate to the problem of distinguishing attacks and tech-
nical failures.
BNs are used for developing medical decision support
systems (Curiac et al. 2009; Kahn et al. 2001; Kahn Jr
et al. 1997; Luciani et al. 2003; Milho and Fred 2001;
Onisko et al. 1999). Furthermore, BNs are also used in
fault diagnosis (Cai et al. 2014; Huang et al. 2008; Zhao
et al. 2013), cyber security (Alile 2018; Apukhtin 2011;
Axelrad et al. 2013; Elmrabit et al. 2020; Greitzer et al.
2010; Greitzer et al. 2012; Herland et al. 2016; Holm
et al. 2015; Ibrahimović and Bajgorić 2016; Kornecki
et al. 2013; Kwan et al. 2009; Kwan et al. 2008; Mo et al.
2009; Pappaterra 2021; Pecchia et al. 2011; Shin et al.
2015; Wang and Guo 2010; Zhou et al. 2018).
In our previous work, we conducted a systematic lit-
erature review of BN models in cyber security (Chocka-
lingam et al. 2017). In that study, we identified 17
standard BN models in cyber security based on the re-
view methodology we adopted. The identified BN
models were analysed using eight different criteria: (i)
citation details, (ii) data sources used to construct Di-
rected Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) and populate Conditional
Probability Tables (CPTs), (iii) the number of nodes
used in the model, (iv) type of threat actor, (v) applica-
tion and application sector, (vi) scope of variables, (vii)
the approach(es) used to validate models and (viii)
model purpose and type of purpose.
Some of the important patterns in the use of standard
BN models in cyber security which we identified in-
cludes: (i) data sources used to construct DAGs and
populate CPTs in the identified BN models were expert
knowledge and empirical data predominantly from cyber
security reports, (ii) the identified BN models were pre-
dominantly used to tackle problems associated with the
Information Technology (IT) environment compared to
the ICS environment and (iii) the identified BN models
completely or partially benefited risk management, fo-
rensic investigation, governance, threat hunting and vul-
nerability management in cyber security.
The identified BN models were considered as a start-
ing point to develop the attack-failure distinguisher
framework for constructing BN models that would help
to distinguish between attacks and technical failures
(Chockalingam et al. 2019). Furthermore, some of the
identified patterns in the use of BN models in cyber se-
curity were used as a basis to construct BN models for
our application. For instance, expert knowledge is a suc-
cessful and well-established alternate data source to
tackle problems associated with ICS environment as
there is a no availability of data from real-world systems
which we considered. Finally, some of the identified pat-
terns in the use of BN models in cyber security were
used as a motivation for this study to fill an identified re-
search gap in addition to considering inputs from such
BN models. For instance, we developed a BN model to
tackle a problem associated with the ICS environment
taking into account BN models used to tackle problems
in IT environment.
(Ahmed et al. 2020) highlighted that distinguishing at-
tacks and technical failures is necessary based on
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interviews with researchers at state-of-the-art testbeds
like SWaT, ICS security experts and engineers at indus-
trial production plants for steel and water. Furthermore,
they described three important challenges of distinguish-
ing attacks and technical failures. One of the challenges
is that related works mainly focus on the consequences
of an attack or technical failure instead of looking into
the properties of an attack or technical failure. Further-
more, they suggested different potential directions that
could help to tackle the problem of distinguishing at-
tacks and technical failures, one of which is to use data
from both the network layer and the process layer.
There are a lot of works that focus on either detecting
an attack or a technical failure separately. For instance,
(Park et al. 2015) proposed an approach to detect sensor
attacks in the presence of transient faults like a GPS
reporting incorrect measurements inside a tunnel. Fur-
thermore, (Samara et al. 2008) proposed a method for
detection of sensor abrupt faults. However, these lack
the capability to distinguish between attacks and tech-
nical failures.
Finally, (Anwar et al. 2015) proposed a data-driven
approach to distinguish cyber-attacks from physical
faults in a smart grid. Furthermore, they compared
their approach with the conventional supervised clas-
sification approaches. However, their approach is not
applicable when there is a lack of data which is typic-
ally the case in cyber security of different domains
like water management.
Conclusions and future work
Harmful consequences of a problem could be minimised
by choosing the appropriate response strategy in a timely
manner. However, this is not possible without determin-
ing the major cause of a problem. In our previous work,
we developed the attack-failure distinguisher framework
which could help to construct BN models that deter-
mine whether the problem is caused by an attack or
technical failure. This framework also includes the
knowledge elicitation methods such as the DeMorgan
model, and probability scales with numerical and verbal
anchors to effectively elicit expert knowledge to con-
struct such BN models. This work mainly focused on
providing a full case study of the framework on how to
construct the BN model for a problem and demonstrate
when and how this could be used in practice.
In this work, we developed a BN model for the prob-
lem of incorrect sensor measurements in floodgates in
the Netherlands using the attack-failure distinguisher
framework. This corresponds to the second main contri-
bution of this paper. Due to the lack of data, we relied
on expert knowledge to construct the qualitative and
quantitative part of the BN model for our problem. We
elicited contributory factors and test results (or
observations) through a focus group workshop and a
questionnaire among respondents who have experience
working with ICS. The data from both the focus group
workshop and questionnaire were used to construct the
qualitative BN model, which was also validated with five
experts.
Once the qualitative BN model was constructed, we
used the DeMorgan model to reduce the number of
CPT entries that needs to be elicited for the problem
variable to nine instead of 256. Firstly, we elicited prob-
abilities corresponding to contributory factors, problem
and test results (or observations) from experts who have
experience working with safety and/or security of water
management infrastructures operated by ICS in the
Netherlands through a focus group workshop and ques-
tionnaire. During this elicitation, we employed probabil-
ity scales with numerical and verbal anchors to facilitate
individual probability entry by providing it as a visual
aid. We computed the rest of the probabilities for the
problem variable using the DeMorgan model. The
process of using attack-failure distinguisher framework
to construct the BN model for our application relates to
the first main contribution of this paper. Finally, we
demonstrated the suitability of the constructed BN
model using two different illustrative scenarios. This as-
sociates with the third main contribution of this paper.
The first illustrative scenario shows that the most likely
cause for the considered problem is technical failure,
whereas the second illustrative scenario shows that the
most likely cause for the considered problem is attack
based on the evidences provided.
It was not possible to use real systems for evaluat-
ing the attack-failure distinguisher framework due to
availability and criticality issues. However, we utilised
real-users and realistic problems to evaluate the
attack-failure distinguisher framework by developing a
prototype and using the developed prototype for two
different illustrative scenarios to relate the results to
real use. Therefore, the developed BN model is usable
in real settings in the future. However, this BN model
can be further updated with appropriate contributory
factors, test results and probabilities based on the
performance measures in the confusion matrix, which
includes four different combinations of diagnosed and
actual classes. This is only possible when a dataset
corresponding to the problem in the real setting is
available for research.
In the future, it would be beneficial to put the con-
structed BN model into practice in a real floodgate in
case it is available to showcase the value of the con-
structed BN model. Furthermore, we developed a root-
cause analysis framework with the appropriate type of
variables and relationships between them in our previous
work, which would help to construct BN models to
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determine the attack-vector (in case of an attack) and
failure mode (in case of a technical failure) (Chockalin-
gam and Katta 2019). However, the root-cause analysis
framework needs to be applied and evaluated for a prob-
lem like incorrect sensor measurements in the future as
it could complement the attack-failure distinguisher
framework to determine the attack-vector (in case of an
attack) and failure mode (in case of a technical failure).
This could also help to choose the most effective re-
sponse strategy between alternatives like repairing or re-
placing the sensor.
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